民主與法治下的抵抗與不服從──最高法院109年度台上字第3695號刑事判決的法哲學反思

Resistance and Disobedience under Democracy and the Rule of Law: Critical Reflections on the Taiwan Supreme Court’s Decision on the Sunflower Movement

本文針對最高法院 109 年度台上字第 3695 號刑事判決進行批判。此判決承認抵抗權，且將抵抗權與不服從行為導向緊急避難之審查。本文論證分為三大部分，第一是從法社會學的角度分析太陽花前十年司法實務的應對模式，包括「靜態形式法治」、「衝突管理」、「寬容放任」乃至於「動態形式法治」。同時期在法學界的倡議下，出現「不服從協同法律論述」，此類論述主張在不服從缺乏實質違法性時，「法律性」即應退讓，法院應找到阻卻不法的方法以做出無罪判決。在第二部分，我分析太陽花運動判決。由於太陽花運動的規模與手段皆超過之前的不服從，以致於之前的模式不敷使用，法院被迫導入「公民不服從」政治道德正當性的判斷，導致出現「裁決變革模式」。第三部分從法律與政治哲學的角度進行分析。本文指出，最高法院之所以採取「裁決變革模式」，是因為「不服從協同法律論述」所隱含的「法治後設論述」，純粹著眼於人民與政府之間的「垂直對抗關係」，卻忽略法治所應發揮之維護社會「水平共生關係」的重要功能。最後，我說明為什麼裁決變革模式不能輕易採用，因其違反權力分立原則，更違反言論自由保障的核心誡命「禁止觀點歧視」，因而只有在符合足以發動抵抗權的極端例外情境下才可使用。

This article critiques the Taiwan Supreme Court’s decision regarding the Sunflower movement. In this decision, the first senate of the Court recognized the right of resistance, and held that the necessity defense is available for defendants claiming resistance and civil disobedience. I argue that this decision is seriously misguided in its theoretical underpinning, which leads to an equally misguided judicial strategy that would aggravate Taiwan’s political polarization. My argument consists of three parts. The first is based on my survey of dozens of judicial decisions in the decade preceding the Sunflower movement. I identify four models of judicial responses, which include “static formal law”, “conflict management”, “tolerant indulgence”, and “dynamic formal law”. In the second part, I analyze major Sunflower decisions. I argue that the Sunflower decisions show both continuity and discontinuity with those preceding judicial models. The radical actions of the Sunflower movement created such pressure on the court that it had to break from the preceding models and adopt still another model, namely “adjudicating change.” In the third part, I argue that the emergence of the “adjudicating change” model is founded on a special meta-narrative of the rule of law held by a segment of Taiwan’s civil society and legal profession. This meta-narrative of the rule of law developed before and during democratic transition, which focuses solely on the vertical social function of restraining the state power, to the neglect of the horizontal function of maintaining social cohesion. I then argue that the adjudicating change model should be strictly limited to truly exceptional occasions of regime survival and should not be operationalized for normal democratic politics.