基礎權利的憲法與政治：當代美國實體正當程序的司法理論爭議及其啟示

The Constitutional Law and Politics of Fundamental Rights: Lessons from the Contemporary Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence in the United States

在一個容認有未列舉之憲法權利存在的自由民主成文憲法秩序下，司法審查與尋常政治程序在是否以及如何保障一項憲法未列舉權利這件事情上，究竟應該如何分工與互動，才能實踐、體現出自由憲政民主秩序對於個人自由與社群民主的雙重許諾？傳統論v. 理性論這項當代美國實體正當程序的司法理論爭議，無疑為這項難題的討論，提供了豐富的素材與資源，並且引領我們省思關於自由憲政民主的不同理解與想像。傳統論者認為，實體正當程序所得承認並給予實質保護的基礎權利，必須是、而且只能是「深植於本國的歷史與傳統」且「內含於有秩序可言之自由」的。理性論者則認為，「內含於有秩序可言之自由」的基礎權利，其意義與可能，終須法院本於自由的憲政義理，做成講理的判斷。本文嘗試梳理這項論辯的經過，並對它可能提供的啟示，提出觀察與評論。本文認為，傳統論的退位與理性論的復甦，公平化了基礎權利的司法論爭場域，並從而有助於憲政社群在社群民主與個人自由之間，探尋出比較妥適的平衡﹔至於一個自由憲政民主社群是否以及何時肯認一項未受成文憲法列舉的基礎權利，終須取決於基礎權利的政治，而司法政治毋寧只是其中的一個部分而非全部。本文據此檢討了美國聯邦最高法院的Obergefell案判決以及臺灣司法院釋字第748號解釋，並對這兩項基礎權利決策的道德正當性，提出肯定論。

In a liberal constitutional democracy that recognizes and protects rights not specifically identified in the written Constitution, how should the courts work with the political branches when an unenumerated right is at issue? When it comes to such controversial issues as abortion and same-sex marriage, what division of labor between judicial review and ordinary political process works best to honor and implement the dual commitment of liberal democracy—i.e., a constitutional order that strives to be both liberal and democratic? These questions have been heatedly debated in the contemporary substantive due process jurisprudence in the United States, and the traditionalism vs. rationalism debate invites us to rethink and reimagine the kind of liberal constitutional democracy we want to achieve. The traditionalists argue that the fundamental rights that warrant substantive due process protection must be“deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”In addition, the traditionalists contend that such fundamental rights must be carefully described and can only function as protections against government intrusion. The rationalists, on the other hand, argue that the recognition of fundamental rights call upon the courts to exercise“reasoned judgment”in light of the constitutional morality as entailed in the concept of ordered liberty. The rationalists refuse to take for granted the epistemic authority of the history and tradition. They also embrace the idea of“living tradition.”
This article details how this doctrinal debate has shaped the modern substantive due process jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. It also seeks to draw lessons from the development of American constitutionalism to inform our normative considerations about written constitutionalism and unenumerated rights in constitutional theory. This article argues that the revitalization of the due process rationalism serves to level the playing field of judicial contestation over fundamental rights. The balancing approach also enables us to strike a proper balance between liberalism and democracy. This article further concurs with the democratic constitutionalism as proposed by Robert Post and Reva Siegel, and calls for an enlarged understanding of the politics of fundamental rights. In view of the respective politics of gay rights in the United States and Taiwan, this article examines and affirms the moral legitimacy and political wisdom of the Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) and the J.Y. Interpretation No. 748 (2017), the two landmark rulings for same-sex marriage in these two countries.