道路交通管理處罰條例強制抽血酒測之憲法審查──評憲法法庭111年憲判字第1號判決

Constitutional Review of the Mandatory Alcohol Blood Testing in Road Traffic Management and Penalty Act: Discussion of No. 1 Judgement of the Constitutional Court

憲法法庭111年憲判字第1號判決，對於道路交通管理處罰條例第35條第5項（現行法改移至同條第6項）作為對肇事駕駛人發動強制實施血液酒精濃度測試之規定，以其限制人身自由、身體權與資訊隱私權違反比例原則、正當法律程序及法律保留原則，為定期失效之違憲宣告，除要求相關機關依判決意旨妥適修法外，於判決公告後、修法前之過渡時期，亦要求交通勤務警察就強制抽血取證程序之實施，應以相對檢察官保留為依歸，並指出受檢測人具有事後向法院聲請撤銷之救濟途徑。本文嘗試就本判決所為之憲法審查，自受理範圍、所涉基本權與各項合憲性具體審查原則之操作等面向為分析，指出其說理瑕疵與缺漏之處，並期盼檢討之結果，就釐清與具體化釋憲本身所涉抽象概念之內涵與審查，有所助益。

In the judgement【No. 1 Judgement (2022) of the Constitutional Court】, Article 35 Paragraph 5 of Road Traffic Management and Penalty Act (currently moved to Paragraph 6 of the same Article) is declared unconstitutional to expire periodically because it restrains personal freedom, body right, and information privacy in violation of proportionality, due process, and statutory reservation. In addition to requiring the relevant authorities to appropriately amend the law in accordance with the intent of the judgement, during the transitional period from the announcement of the judgement to the amendment of the law, it also requires that the implementation of the mandatory blood test procedure by the traffic police should be reserved by the prosecutor except urgent situations, and points out that the tested person could seek for the legal relief from the court. This study aimed to analyze this judgment in terms of the scope of admissibility, the fundamental rights involved, and the operation of the specific principles of constitutional review, pointing out the flaws and omissions in its reasoning. Hoping this study may help to clarify and concretize the connotation and examination of the abstract concepts involved in the constitutional review.