英文摘要 |
The main purpose of this treatise is to clarify the issue of Art. 41 of the Personal Data Protection Act, which criminalized purposely acquiring, processing or utilizing personal data without the legitimate reasons. We could say that, the judgement on act of committing crime of this code is reduced to mere form, as revealed by the 2020 Tai-Shang-Da-Zi Decision No. 1869 of the Criminal Grand Chamber of the Supreme Court. This controversial issues could be stated in two significant figures. First, the essence of personal data breach is absent of criminology reality. Namely, the definition for“encroaching on information privacy”or“injury to personality right”as a criminal act is ambiguous and lacks clarity in judicial practice. Secondly, as regards the application of the legal requisites of this criminal act, it could be explained in certain formalized ways. Especially, we could see the cases about the defamation by using one’s personal data, which might be lack of relevance in infringement of right to informational self-determination, but still are accused guilty on the court. Therefore, to confront with this dilemma, I would illustrate the essential meaning of the crime of encroaching on information privacy in terms of legal protection analysis. In that way, I suggest a feasible approach to interpret this crime based on the content of the“dataveillance”, which can be used to restrict the boundary of the application of this crime. As a consequence, the structure of judgement on this crime can be shown accordingly. |