資訊公開於我國公司治理之再定位──以定期性財務資訊為中心

Reconsidering the Effect of Information Disclosure on Corporation Governance Issue in Taiwan--Focus on Periodic Financial Reporting

系所名稱：法律研究所
學位別：碩士
畢業學年：97年
指導教授：曾宛如
亞太固網弊案之發生使立法院醞釀於公司法中回復強制公開發行制度，其背後之思維即是欲透過證券交易法中資訊公開之規範以強化公司治理，而本文即是針對資訊公開與公司治理間之關聯進行討論，並就此修正草案之成效進行評析。一方面為了使討論能聚焦於資訊公開與公司治理之關係，另一方面為模擬強制公開發行草案之立法思維，本文所討論之公司限定於不具備相當規模流通市場之股份有限公司。透過相關文獻之研究可發現於股份有限公司關於資訊公開之討論多集中於與證券交易相關之議題上，純粹處理資訊與公司治理兩者間關係者甚少，雖然如此，但仍可從中建立起資訊公開與公司治理之關聯。然應注意的是在透過資訊公開以促成公司治理之過程中，資訊中介者扮演著相當重要之地位，因此本文即依此架構「資訊－資訊中介者－公司治理」進行討論。但在依此架構進行討論之前，有一問題需要先行處理，即是如何確保資訊之正確？此問題在公司治理之議題中特別重要，原因在於依現行法制之規定，公司經營者為最主要之資訊提供者，但其同時也是被監督者，因此公司經營者有很大之可能提供錯誤資訊以逃避責任之追究。透過相關之研究可發現，英美兩國制定眾多規範試圖確保公司經營者揭露正確之資訊，然成效似不顯著。而本文認為此處問題之關鍵應在於當立法者要求公司經營者提供資訊時，仍舊會面臨難以解決之代理問題，因此當資訊是由公司經營者所提供，該資訊將永遠潛存錯誤之風險。至於在「資訊－資訊中介者－公司治理」此架構之討論中，首先必須釐清對於不具備相當規模流通市場之股份有限公司而言，有哪些機制可成為適當之資訊中介者。其次，再檢視各別機制運用公司資訊以促進公司治理過程中所會面臨到之問題。經過研究後可發現對於此些機制而言，除了資訊問題外，尚有其他之障礙會阻礙其促進公司治理效能之發揮；此外，真正有助於此些機制發揮公司治理效能之資訊並非公司經營者所提供之資訊，而是與公司有所互動之他人所提供之資訊。綜上，本文對於新強制公開發行制度修正草案所可能帶來之效能持保留之看法。此外，於討論公司治理議題中之資訊問題時，本文認為立法者不應該再一昧要求公司經營者提供更多資訊，反而應要求建立適當之吹哨者機制，因為該種類資訊方能真正促使公司治理之效能之提升。

Because of the Asia Pacific Broadband Telecom Company case, the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China considers to re-adopt the mandatory public offering rule in the Company Act. The legislation aims at helping people overcome the difficulty of corporate governance through the information disclosure rules in the Securities and Exchange Act. Based on this background understanding, this thesis would like to discuss the relationship between information disclosure and corporate governance. In addition, the effect of this legislation is another subject which this thesis wants to look into. In order to make sure that the discussions can focus on the relationship between information disclosure and corporate governance, and meanwhile, to follow the thought of this legislation, this thesis will target on the corporation without the regular stock exchange market. Most of the discussions about the information issue in the corporate subject focus on the securities exchange question and few of them talk about the the relationship between information disclosure and corporate governance. However, we can still find out the connection between the information disclosure and corporate governance. When talking about the relationship between the information disclosure and corporate governance, the intermediator plays a key role in it. Without the help of the intermediator, informations will not have any actual effect to this world, because it is impossible for the information to change the real world by itself. From this viewpoint, this thesis will develop under the''information-intermediator-corporate governance'' framework.However, a problem need to be solved before discussing this framework: how to make sure the information is correct? This is a serious problem since under current regulations, the management is the information provider, but the management need to be supervised at the same time. Therefore, it is possible that the management will provide incorrect information to avoid accountability. The U.S. and U.K. attempt to deal with this problem through the enforcement of a number of detailed regulations, but the outcome is still quite dissapointed. The difficulty here lies on the unsloved “agency problem” when the legislator asks the management to provide the information. As long as the mangement is the information provider, there are always possibilities of fraud since the managemet may try to take advantage of the agency problem.As to the issues of ''information-intermediator-corporate governance'', this thesis will first discuss the environment of the target corporation in order to find out the mechanism which is suitable to be the intermediator. This thesis will then look into how these mechanisms work for the corporate governance. It can be found that there are a lot of problems which obstruct the operation of mechanisms, besides that, some of them are not the information problems but other problems such as independence as well. From the discussions of the above two issues, this thesis will point out that the really useful information is not the information which is provided by the management, but the information offered by those who have interactions with the corporation.In conclusion, this thesis questions the mandatory public offering rule since its purpose cannot be achieved. Furthermore, this thesis suggests that when talking about the information problem in corporate governance issue, the legislator should put emphasis on the whistleblower system rather than ask the management to disclose more information. Because it is usually the information provided by the whistleblower that is useful for the corporate governance issue.