| 中文摘要 |
"本院今日無需去探索供述證據之極限範圍，因為本院在本案的判決是根據供述證據之概念的核心意義。美國憲法增修條文第五條之不自證己罪特權主要是為了防止專斷不公的中世紀教會法院和星室法庭之再現。即使在本案犯罪嫌疑人並未被施以酷刑，但是犯罪嫌疑人不論是在刑事審判中或在羈押偵訊中，都必須面對如中世紀時期犯罪嫌疑人遭受星室法院操作自證己罪、偽證罪以及藐視法庭罪之三擇一困境。因此，無論供述證據包括之範圍為何，本院在Doe v. United States案闡明之供述證據的定義，必須包括刑事審判中將宣誓犯罪嫌疑人置於自證己罪、作偽證以及藐視法庭之三擇一困境的所有提問之供述回答。這個結論符合本院在Doe v. United States案認為「大多數的言詞陳述會被認為具有供述性質，因為只有在極少數情況下口頭或書面的言詞陳述不是為揭露資訊或事實主張的意思表示傳達」的結論。當一個犯罪嫌疑人被要求回答一個需要他表達對於事實所知所信的提問時，此犯罪嫌疑人即面對誠實回答、說謊或保持沈默之三擇一困境，因此不論犯罪嫌疑人的回答是真或假都具有供述性質。We need not explore the outer boundaries of what is 'testimonial' today, for our decision flows from the concept's core meaning. Because the privilege was designed primarily to prevent 'a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality,' it is evident that a suspect is 'compelled to be a witness against himself' at least whenever he must face the modern-day analog of the historic trilemma -- either during a criminal trial where a sworn witness faces the identical three choices, or during custodial interrogation where, as we explained in Miranda v. Arizona, the choices are analogous and hence raise similar concerns. Whatever else it may include, therefore, the definition of 'testimonial' evidence articulated in Doe v. United States must encompass all responses to questions that, if asked of a sworn suspect during a criminal trial, could place the suspect in the 'cruel trilemma.' This conclusion is consistent with our recognition in Doe v. United States that 'the vast majority of verbal statements thus will be testimonial' because 'there are very few instances in which a verbal statement, either oral or written, will not convey information or assert facts.' Whenever a suspect is asked for a response requiring him to communicate an express or implied assertion of fact or belief, the suspect confronts the 'trilemma' of truth, falsity, or silence and hence the response (whether based on truth or falsity) contains a testimonial component." |
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