"法學英文：Pennsylvania v. Inocencio Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990)."

"本院自Schmerber v. California案後，就將「供述證據」與「實證或物證」之區分適用在不利證據是透過犯罪嫌疑人意志行為所產生的其他情況。在United States v. Wade案中，本院裁決犯罪嫌疑人可被迫參與列隊指認和重述警方提供的短句，讓證人能夠看他和聽他的聲音。本院解釋，要求犯罪嫌疑人參與列隊指認和重述警方提供的短句，是強迫被告展示他的生理特徵，而非強迫被告揭露其所知情事。在Gilbert v. California案中，本院裁決犯罪嫌疑人可被迫提供字跡樣本。本院解釋，不同於犯罪嫌疑人所寫下的內容，警方要求犯罪嫌疑人提供的字跡樣本，如同聲音或身體本身一樣，是用來識別犯罪嫌疑人的生理特徵，不在美國憲法增修條文第五條之不自證己罪特權的保護範圍。在United States v. Dionisio案中，本院裁決犯罪嫌疑人可被迫念一段文字，以便提供聲音樣本。本院解釋，警方將犯罪嫌疑人的聲音予以錄音，僅是用來識別犯罪嫌疑人的生理特徵，而非是為了將犯罪嫌疑人所陳述的「證詞或意思表示傳達的內容」當成供述證據。We have since applied the distinction between 'real or physical' and 'testimonial' evidence in other contexts where the evidence could be produced only through some volitional act on the part of the suspect. In United States v. Wade, we held that a suspect could be compelled to participate in a lineup and to repeat a phrase provided by the police so that witnesses could view him and listen to his voice. We explained that requiring his presence and speech at a lineup reflected 'compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have.' In Gilbert v. California, we held that a suspect could be compelled to provide a handwriting exemplar, explaining that such an exemplar, 'in contrast to the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physical characteristic outside the privilege's protection.' And in United States v. Dionisio, we held that suspects could be compelled to read a transcript in order to provide a voice exemplar, explaining that the 'voice recordings were to be used solely to measure the physical properties of the witnesses' voices, not for the testimonial or communicative content of what was to be said.'"