英文摘要 |
The provisions of Article 27(14) and (15) of the Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions Act, which failed to be thoroughly debated in the legislative process and did not record the legislative reasons, have recently been used in the battle for the right to manage the company, highlighting its problematic points. This article focuses on the requirements and effects of ''for the purpose of mergers and acquisitions'', ''acquisition'' and non-voting rights when acquiring shares illegally, from the perspective of functional orientation, and adopts Article 43-1, Item 1 of the current Securities Exchange Act. The research results of comparative law in this article clarify the explanation and applicable connotation of these constituent elements. At the same time, the legal effects of non-voting rights on shares obtained in violation of these regulations involve issues such as ''who shall be determined'' and ''when shall be determined'' in the matter of their non-voting rights. This article argues that if it fails to apply for leave to the court before the shareholders' meeting to stop the exercise of voting rights, then at the shareholders' meeting, the power to determine non-voting shares lies with the chairman of the shareholders' meeting according to law, and the chairman of the shareholders' meeting should do his best in this regard. The chairman bears obligation of care, to determine the existence of voting rights for such shares. If the chairman of the shareholders' meeting fails to perform his duty of care, and subsequent resolutions of the shareholders' meeting are subsequently revoked by courts due to flaws in the resolution method, he shall be liable for damages due to the breach of his duty of care. |