英文摘要 |
The upstream market structure of Taiwan's Cable TV industry is highly concentrated which, hence, results in a highly concentrated in downstream market either. In addition, the firms with dominant strength in upstream and downstream market belong to the same groups. For examples, the Kbro, a downstream system firm, owns 30% of subscriber and owns 20 channels in upstream market through its own Kbro Channel subsidiary and the agents with advantages. Another system group, the China Network Systems, which also owns the dominant power in the downstream, also owns 23.78% of system market and 11 important channels in upstream channel market. In the channel market, once a firm gets the market power, it will abuse this power to raise the prices of channel selling. On the one hand, it can earn more commerce returns and, on the other hand, prevent the new entrants in the system market. Through the empirical analysis, we find that the trade between the channel firms with dominant market power and new firms in system market, which is based on the minimum guaranteed subscriber number of 15% administrative households, will rise up the prices of channels 3-5 times. This trading institution will obviously mark up the operation cost of new entrants in system market and limit their market competency as compared with the incumbents. In addition, this will also result in the obstacles of incumbents' entrance of cross operating in other districts and strictly impede the competition policies implemented by the authorities. Therefore, the National Communication Committee(NCC) should prohibit such an inadequate trading institution. |