戰後東北問題與遠東冷戰的開展

Postwar Manchuria and Political Developments in the Far East during the Cold War Era

本文擬從戰後冷戰的發展脈絡，重新審思美國政府如何面對國民政府接收東北的失敗與改採「棄中扶日」政策，及兩者之間的因果關係。為釐清美國政府如何將原本扶植的對象由中國改為日本的來龍去脈，本文首先探究蔣介石、毛澤東兩人以及美蘇兩國對東北接收與國共和談的基本態度，繼而討論蔣介石與美國之間意見日趨分歧、毛澤東與蘇聯之間意見日趨整合等情勢的演變，對蔣介石、毛澤東兩人在東北布局所造成的具體影響。最後，再聚焦探討美國政府如何反制蘇聯的背信與中共的崛起，並援用圍堵政策，改以扶植日本政府作為東亞反共堡壘。

This article reexamines the causal relationship between the U.S. government's response to the failure of the Nationalist government to take over Manchuria and the U.S. policy of ''abandoning China and supporting Japan'' in the context of the development of the Cold War. In order to clarify the background of how the U.S. government changed its policy from initially supporting China to supporting Japan after Japan's surrender, this article first discusses the basic attitudes of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and the U.S. and the Soviet Union toward Manchuria and the peace talks between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. It also compares the evolution of the increasingly divergent views between Chiang Kai-shek and the U.S. with the increasingly integrated views between Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union, and their specific impact on the deployments ordered by Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong in Manchuria. Finally, this article focuses on how the U.S. government counteracted the Soviet Union's breach of trust and the rise of the Chinese Communist Party, and how it pursued the policy of containment in favor of propping up the Japanese government as an anti-communist bulwark in East Asia.