美國聯邦法院內的審級遵從──委託代理人論的觀點

Hierarchical Obedience in the United States Federal Courts: From the Perspective of Principal-agent Theory

近年來，司法行為學者透過委託代理人論的分析架構指出，聯邦上訴法院對於聯邦最高法院的判斷有著一致性和回應性，可認為在聯邦法院內存在著普遍的遵從現象。聯邦最高法院藉由策略地發出移審令和技巧地撰寫法律原理，從而能有效率地篩選不服從判決，並促進聯邦下級法院的遵從。雖然司法行為學者表示，聯邦法官面對的資訊狀態和他的有限理性的判斷模式，以及聯邦司法對聯邦法官建構出追求自我偏好和個人聲譽的誘因和機會，均有助於促進聯邦法官選擇審級遵從的行為，然而卻未充分說明，聯邦法官是否有厭惡判決撤銷的想法，以及聯邦法官如何就法律、自我偏好與個人利益間進行抵換，從而尚難認為委託代理人論已完全解析聯邦法院內審級遵從的機制。

In recent years, scholars on judicial behavior have drawn on the analytical framework of the principal-agent theory and suggested that the United States courts of appeals manifest congruence and responsiveness to judgments passed by the Supreme Court of the United States. As a result, the phenomenon of obedience is deemed to be generally present in the United States federal courts. By strategically granting a writ of certiorari and skillfully drafting legal doctrines, the Supreme Court of the United States can effectively screen out disobeying judgments and promote obedience from lower federal courts. According to scholars on judicial behavior, the status of information faced by a federal judge, a federal judge’s bounded rationality when making a judgment, and the incentives and opportunities that the federal judiciary creates to encourage federal judges to pursue personal preferences and reputation may all contribute to the federal judges’choice to behave with hierarchical obedience. However, no detailed discussion has yet been provided regarding whether federal judges develop the idea of reversal aversion, and how federal judges make a trade-off between the law and their personal preferences and interests. In this light, the principal-agent theory remains difficult to be established as having completely unraveled the mechanism of hierarchical obedience in the United States federal courts.