英文摘要 |
In order to protect rice farmers, the rice market of Taiwan was not opened to foreign countries before joining in the WTO in 2002 and the quantity of imported rice has been increasing since then. Question has been raised if the implication of more quantity of the imported rice should indicate that the government neglects the rice growers? This paper tries to find the economic effects of rice import policy through empirical analysis. To investigate the effects of economic preference on the import policy empirical, we combine Grossman-Helpman's ''protection for sale'' model, namely, the political economy of trade protection explained by the import penetration ratio, with Maggi and Rodrigues-Clare's ''standard short-run political economy'' model, regarding to the government's objective is taken to be a weighted sum of consumers' surplus, producers' surplus, quota rents to importers and revenue from trade policy. We set up a generalized government utility maximization model of agricultural import policy. This paper also has developed an empirical model of Taiwan's rice import policy to find the economic effects. By examining the series data of Taiwan rice from 1978 to 2004, we calculated the policy relative weight by the estimation of the empirical import penetration function and the demand of rice. The results are as follows: the relative weights of the producers' surplus, rents to importers and revenue from trade policy are 0.38, 0.43 and 0.23 from 1978 to 2004. We find that the government paid more attention to the producer of rice than the consumers in the past years, but it decreases in these years after joining in WTO. The effects to the domestic rice growers are obvious due to the government's import policy, opens up the market to foreign countries gradually. The policy relative weight had been verified to apply to the policy valuation. |