論意志的自由：從奧古斯丁與阿奎那的觀點

On the Freedom of the Will: From the Perspectives of Augustine and Aquinas

本文認為，奧古斯丁主張一種以救恩為中心的人性意志觀，阿奎那則對人 性以及自由抉擇的本質保持較樂觀的態度。奧古斯丁所說的自由代表存在性的 恢復，是一個以上主作為其目標的救恩地位。這個終極目標超過人的能力，故 而人的命運在全能全知者的手中形同不確定。本文以為，奧氏將意願的行使當 成擁有自由實缺乏說服力，並且質疑將預知和預定兩者做區分的傳統。順此反 觀，則可見阿奎那肯定人性意志在倫理實踐上的有效性。

 

上主是萬事的原初與目的因，但祂的攝理與預定卻不屬於受造意志的本 質，也不會剝奪意志的能力。阿奎那的思考模型將宇宙萬事視為存在於同一個 結構穩定的大次序鏈中，並試圖讓受造意志在人性的動態處境中得以發揮正向 或負面的作用。本文認為，阿奎那的解決方案至終依然無法突破預定行為對受 造者終極命運的主宰力，亦同意所謂的自由，代表不犯罪的自由，但也只有藉 由相信預定者的啟示，受造者才能經歷這種自由。

 

The author contends that Augustine maintained a salvation-centered view of the human will, while Aquinas tended to be more optimistic on human nature and the freedom of choice per se. Augustine took human will for free so long as any choice is made as a result of personal volition without duress. However, the author shows that, for Augustine, the so-called freedom stands for the status of salvation which has God as its goal, an existential restoration. Since the goal of such ultimate salvation is beyond human capability, and in light of the fact that human destiny hangs uncertainly in relation to the almighty and omniscient God, it is unconvincing to equate the exercise of personal volition with freedom. The author also questions the wisdom of making distinction between foreknowledge and predestination, as it appears in the Augustinian tradition and is repeated in Aquinas’s idea. The distinction attempts to justify the claim that what God foreknows would not intervene the freedom of the will, on the ground that what is foreknown is being played out unforcefully according to the divine mega plan. This attempt fails to account for what the predestination implies for the human status in regard to the saving grace and the ultimate fate. Aquinas affirms the practical function of the human will in fulfilling an ethical life. The will comes under the guidance of the intellect, while at the same time affecting the intellect by its determination. God is the first and final cause of all creatures, yet His providence and predestination are not part of the nature of the created will, and would not negatively undermine its power. Metaphysically speaking, Aquinas’s model of the ladder of created beings which envisions a static cosmos, along with his adoption of the Aristotelian hylomorphism, can work to accommodate the active role of created will in the dynamic change of human condition, for better or for worse. Although this accommodation acknowledges the superiority of a transcendental design, the author finds it an unsatisfactory solution to the seemingly overriding power of the providential mind. In the final analysis, the author admits that freedom means being free not to sin. Only by a living faith in the truth of revelation can the created will experience such freedom.