考慮產業先期行動誘因之排放權

Incorporating Industrial’s Early Action Incentive into Allowance Allocation Rule

排放權 (emission allowance) 核配是排放交易制度的核心課題，攸關整體交易制度的效率性 (達到成本有效性)、公平性 (考慮廠商先期行動績效) 與環境有效性 (排放量低)，已引起諸多的討論。Böhringer and Lange (2005) 指出傳統溯往核配原則 (grandfathering rule) (亦稱歷史核配法) 缺乏廠商近期排放量資訊之問題，進而，提出同時納入歷史與近期排放資訊的混合核配原則。Rosendahl (2008) 認為，納入廠商近期排放量資訊，雖然短期可以提高排放權核配效率，然而，將提高廠商進行排放策略行為誘因行為 (亦即多排放)，喪失環境有效性。本研究認為，如果核配制度設計缺乏先期行動 (early action) 誘因機制，將不具公平性、效率性及環境有效性。爰此，本研究修正Böhringer and Lange (2005)及Rosendahl (2008) 模型，納入廠商先期行動誘因機制，並建立「內生」 (endogenous) 核配原則，亦即建立先期減量行動績效與排放權核配連結機制，探討兼具效率性、公平性與環境有效性之排放權核配制度設計之問題。進而，再依據本研究建立的核配原則，進行數值模擬分析。

Allowance allocation associated with cost effectiveness, environmental effectiveness as well as fairness issues, which are more concerned by the literatures recently. Böhringer and Lange (2005) indicated that the grandfathering rule was not a good allocation method for lacking updated emission information linkage. As a result, a mixed allocation rule was provided. Rosendahl (2008) found that updated rule had its advantages, but it might stimulate strategic emission behavior by firms, this will lose environmental effectiveness. This research sets up an endogenous mixed allocation theoretic model to compare the performance of cost effectiveness, environmental effectiveness and fairness among three allocation rules. Furthermore, this study uses the emissions data of iron & steel industry to certify the results of theoretic model.