英文摘要 |
The ruling party often utilizes the executive power to stimulate the economic prosperity by manipulating financial policies before elections in democratic states. It isso-called “the political business cycle theory (PBC).” The goal of this paper is to test the financial expenditures at TaoChuMiao area county governments in Taiwan by the political business cycle theory. The research findings show that: 1. the financial expenditures of county governments at TaoChuMiao area in the electoral years don’t vary significantly with that in the non-election years. 2. The financial expenditures of county governments at TaoChuMiao area between the different ruling parties do vary significantly. This finding is inconsistent with Solano (1983), Rice (1986), but it is consistent with Swank (1988), Blais and Nadeau (1992), Reid (1998), Drazen (2000), Bodet (2011) and Hwang (2011; 2012). 3. The financial expenditures of county governments at TaoChuMiao area in the first term commissioners do vary significantly with that in the second term commissioners, but they spent less in the first terms than in the second terms. According to these research findings, it seems obvious that only the partisan PBC theory has been verified at TaoChuMiao area in Taiwan. |