英文摘要 |
In this paper I discuss Xiangshan’s unity of two minds in order toexplore its ethical implications and the roots of its philosophical history. Thetwo minds mean Dao mind and human mind, and the so-called one mind isthe unity of the two. And this unity in my paper is regarded as theone-mind’s rise or fall by the interpretation of Tang Junyi(唐君毅), and asa concept of self to combine two minds in according to Xiangshan’s text, theunity is a self who makes a decision for or against his original mind, thus it istwo beginnings of the same mind. In a word, the mind rises when the self’sdecision conforms with his original mind, and the same mind falls when hisdecision violates it. In according to the concept of self the possibility ofhuman’s moral norm and responsibility can be explained. The distinctionbetween the two minds is established by a transcendental analysis of theirrespective conceptual content, and the point is to reveal the character oforiginal mind. But the concept of original mind doesn’t demonstrate thewhole but only a part of moral consciousness, because it doesn’t imply thepossibility of evil and thus fails to explain the concept of evildoer and thepossible responsibility for his evil. The concept of the self indicates the twobeginnings of the human consciousness and as such constitute the whole ofmoral consciousness: the original mind is mine, and I am also the evildoer,thus the self is nothing but the ultimate subject for the possibility of good andevil. The above analysis is based on the Mencius text quoted by Xiangshan.That is, Xiangshan’s two minds in one, in both its ethical implications andphilosophical history, is dependent on his interpretation of Mencius text. |