康德之力的概念：經驗論者或理性論者？

Kant's Concept of Force: Empiricist or Rationalist?

本論文探討康德對於力的說明。這個題目在康德所處的時代中，位於哲學關懷的核心地位，但在他的各種《批判》裡，他卻沒有明示地處理過這個題目。正如同時間與空間的本質以及人類意志的本質，康德回應有關哲學家與自然科學家爭論力的本質之成果。然而，康德並沒有在他的《批判》中，將力作為一個明示的主題，因而並沒有針對力的概念，提供一個明示的先驗說明。不過，我論證，吾人的確可以在康德哲學中尋獲一個有關力的先驗說明，而且這是一個經驗論與理性論說明的綜合，只不過在一處意想不到的地方：在《第三批判》中，有關合目的性原則的討論裡。

This paper explores Kant's account of force, a topic that was of central philosophical concern in his day, but which he does not explicitly address in any of his Critiques. Just as with the nature of space and time and the nature of the human will, the nature of force was under dispute by the philosophers and natural scientists to whose legacy Kant was responding. Yet, Kant does not make force an explicit topic of his Critiques, and thus provides no explicit transcendental account of force. Nevertheless, I will argue that one can indeed find in Kant a transcendental account of force, one that is a synthesis of empiricist and rationalist accounts, but in an unexpected place; the third Critique, in the discussion of the principle of purposiveness.