概念論與現象特性

Conceptualism and Phenomenal Character

當代心智哲學有兩個重要爭議：一是關於意識之現象特性（phenomenal character）的表徵論（representationalism）與反表徵論（anti-representationalism）之爭；另一是關於經驗內容的概念論（conceptualism）與非概念論（nonconceptualism）之爭。第一個論爭，可稱為感質之爭（the qualia debate），討論意識的現象特性是否能完全被表徵內容所窮盡。第二個論爭的焦點在於，知覺經驗的內容是否由我們的概念能力（conceptual capacities）所參與構成，以致於完全是概念性的內容（conceptual content）。大部分哲學家認為這兩個爭論互不相干，或認為應該分開處理。在本文中，我指出這兩個爭議其實有一明顯且重要的關連。那就是：在第二個論爭中若採取概念論的立場，那麼在第一個論爭中就非得採取表徵論不可。更進一步說，本文要論證兩件事：第一，概念論可以視為是一種特殊版本的表徵論。一旦釐清這點，持概念論者就需要提出理由來反對非意向性感質（nonintentional qualia）的存在。原因是：如果知覺經驗除了意向性內容之外，還具有非意向性的感質為其成分的話，那麼知覺經驗的內容就無法完全是概念性的。第二，雖然McDowell的概念論將知覺經驗的內容理解為一種Fregean sense，而非理解為某種心理表徵（mentalrepresentation），這樣的立場仍然得面對「顛倒地球論證」（the Inverted Earth argument）的攻擊。概念論並不一定因此失敗，但任何為概念論的辯護都必須設法回應這項攻擊。

Consider two of the central debates in the contemporary philosophy of mind: the debate between representationalism and anti-representationalism about phenomenal character, and the debate between conceptualism and nonconceptualism about the content of experience. The former, the qualia debate, centers on whether the phenomenal character of conscious experience is exhausted by its representational content. The latter is about whether conceptual capacities are constitutive of the representational content of perceptual experience such that the only kind of content that perceptual experience possesses is conceptual content. Most philosophers consider these two debates as unrelated, or at least should be treated separately. In this paper, I argue that there is an obvious and important sense in which the two issues are related. More specifically, if one accepts conceptualism, it would impose a significant constraint on what position one is allowed to take in the qualia debate. First, I suggest that once it is made clear that conceptualism can be considered as a particular version of representationalism, the conceptualist would have to take a certain stance on whether there are nonintentional qualia. The reason why the conceptualist needs to worry about the qualia issue is that if in addition to intentional content perceptual experiences also contain nonintentional qualia as constituents, then perceptual experiences cannot be fully conceptual. Second, I argue that although in McDowellian conceptualism the content of perceptual experience is construed in terms of Fregean sense rather than internal mental representation, it still faces challenges from the Inverted Earth argument against representationalism. My goal is not to show that conceptualism fails, but toshow that it is a serious issue that the defenders of conceptualism have to take into consideration.