意義與意向是次性嗎？──萊特的依賴判斷理論之評析

Are Meanings and Intentions Secondary Properties?-On Wright's Judgment-Dependence Account

萊特（Crispin Wright, 1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998）在近年來提出一個重要的立場，認為意義與意向在形上本質上應被視為次性（secondary property）。萊特的立場建立在一個所謂的「判斷依決理論」（Judgment-Dependence Account）上，其基本主張為，如同某物是否屬於某顏色概念之外延，須得取決於認知主體對此物所做之相關反應或判斷，人所使用文字之意義與人所擁有心理意向之內容，亦須由人對它們所做的相關判斷所決定。柏哥席恩（Boghossian, 1989）在後續的討論裡，對萊特理論提出一個重要的批評。柏哥席恩指出，萊特的理論無法滿足一個內部的限制條件，即獨立性條件，因而此理論無法成立，對意義與意向之解釋而言，亦是一個無效的理論。筆者首先釐清柏哥席恩批評的要旨、以及其效力，並進一步指出，萊特的判斷依決理論在理解上有模糊性，一旦釐清此模糊性，我們發現，萊特理論的其中一個理解版本會受到柏哥席恩的攻擊，然另一個理解版本將可恰當地避開。本文的主要目的在藉由上述之討論，給出一個較為可行與合理的判斷依決理論之版本，並以此版本，闡明萊特理論的基本精神與內容，並於結論裡，評析將語意與意向定位為次性在哲學上的意涵與前瞻性。

Crispin Wright (1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1989c, 1992, 1998) has recently proposed that meanings and intentions be metaphysically construed as secondary properties. Just as what falls under the extension of a color concept is dependent on how a perceiver's relevant responses or judgments made under suitable conditions, the contents of what a person means by a term or of what a person intends cannot be determined independently of the person's relevant judgments. Wright's position is called ”Judgment-Dependence Account”, given the judgment-dependence nature of meanings and intentions.Paul Boghossian (1989) has pointed out that Wright's judgment-dependence account violates an internal constraint, i.e., the ”independence” condition, imposed by the theory itself. Consequently, Wright's theory is fundamentally flawed as an account of meanings and intentions. In this paper, I argue that Wright's judgment-dependence account is ambiguous. As a result, Boghossian's criticism is effective against one version of Wright's account, but it can be avoided on another version of Wright's account. The aim of this paper is to clarify what Wright's judgment-dependence account amounts to, by giving it a more plausible and reasonable version than some other versions such as the one under Boghossian's attack. This paper ends with some comments on the significance and prospects of Wright's proposal, based on the more plausible version of Wright's judgment-dependence account, that meanings and intentions be characterized as secondary properties.