老子性超善惡論評析

Human Nature as Transcending both Good and Evil in the Laozi: A Critical Review

就晚近老學發展可見，老子人性論研究並未因《老子》不言「性」字而出現窒礙；相反，或許正是由於擺脫了字詞觀念的束縛，老子人性論的詮釋空間才得以大幅拓展。譬如有謂老子倡言「人性自然」，有謂老子主張「人性本真」，亦有謂老子是某一型態的性善論者，更有謂老子之人性思想唯「性超善惡」可當之。在這些詮釋中，「性超善惡論」常為學人倡說，亦廣泛見於各種道家研究或中國哲學史之論著。因此，對性超善惡論作一綜合性的引介，並評析其優劣得失，在老子人性論的探討工作上，當能起到一些澄清思路、發現問題，從而去蕪存菁的效用。當然，評析並不涵蘊提出善解，但對於善解的提出來說，卻無疑是一項具有方法論意義的預備工作。

Instead of being an obstacle to the study of the theory of human nature in the Laozi, the absence of the term xing has commonly been seen as permitting scholars to provide various interpretations on how Laozi defines xing, say, xing as something natural (xing ziran), genuine (xing zhen), good (xing shan), or transcending both good and evil (xing chao shan e). Among these views, the last can be said to be the prevalent one, given that it has widely be mentioned in academic works on Daoism as well as the history of Chinese philosophy. In this sense, it is reasonable to expect that, by reviewing the notion of xing chao shan e in a critical way, some theoretical details or logical consequences that help understanding Laozi's attitude toward xing will be clarified. Though critically reviewing the notion of xing chao shan e does not imply reinterpreting it in a much more reasonable way, the former, methodologically speaking, serves undoubtedly as a preparation for the latter.