中文摘要 |
美國的相關法律允許商務部在反補貼調查中適用外部基準來計算政府提供貸款或商品而產生的補貼利益,它類似於反傾銷調查中的“替代國”方法,當商務部認定政府對市場的干預形成價格扭曲時,就轉而適用外部基準計算補貼的利益,這往往會致使最後得出的補貼利益增加。然而《補貼與反補貼措施協定》中並沒有外部基準的明確規定,因此美國的補貼基準制度在WTO爭端解決機制中多次受到挑戰。從有關外部基準的WTO相關案例中可看出,WTO上訴機構對於外部基準適用的解讀經歷了一個先放開後限制的過程。中國是受到美國反補貼調查最多的國家,且美國對中國的反補貼案件適用外部基準已成為常態,因此理解WTO框架下對於外部基準解讀的變化對於中國應對美國反補貼調查有重要意義。
Relevant U.S. regulations permit USDOC's use of external benchmark when calculating subsidy benefit offered by government's provision of loans or goods during countervailing investigations. It resembles 'Surrogate Country System' in anti-dumping investigations. When USDOC discovers that the domestic prices of the good in question are distorted by government's intervention, it will preclude domestic prices as appropriate benchmark and use external benchmark instead, which may significantly increase the subsidy benefits. Since there is no expressed rule about external benchmark in Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, USDOC's use of external benchmark has been challenged under WTO dispute resolution mechanism many times. Reading from relevant WTO cases, the attitude of the Appellate Body toward the use of external benchmark shows a conversion from opening to restricting. China suffered the most countervailing investigations of USDOC, in which the use of external benchmark has become a routine. Accordingly, understanding how the rules of external benchmark have changed in WTO dispute cases is necessary for China to cope with future countervailing investigations of USDOC. |