我國地方政府之效率分析－－一階段隨機邊界分析法之應用

An Application of the One-Stage Stochastic Frontier Analysis to the Analysis of Local Government Efficiency in Taiwan

本研究的目的在探討台灣地方政府的效率，更進一步分析導致無效率的因素，並提出政策建議以提高我國地方政府的效率。本研究以Brueckner （1979）的選民競租模型，說明地方政府所提供之地方性公共財貨與勞務水準與轄區內土地最大潛在市值的關係，並說明地方政府的無效率因素會反向地影響轄區內土地總市值。在控制可能影響土地市值的因素後，本研究利用Battese and Coelli （1995）的一階段隨機邊界分析法，衡量地方政府轄區內土地總市值與最大潛在市值之間的偏離程度，以評估地方政府的效率，並同時估計無效率模型。實證結果顯示台灣各地方政府在地方性公共財貨與勞務的提供，存在顯著的效率差異。其次，在樣本期間內，整體地方政府的效率水準有逐年下滑的趨勢。再者，地方政府的效率水準與該地方政府公教人員擁有大專以上學歷的比例，以及公教人員占居民總數的比例，呈現顯著正相關；與地方政府的補助及協助收入依存度，呈現顯著負相關。因此，鼓勵公教人員在職進修，增加公教人員的僱用及提升地方政府的財政自主程度，有助於地方政府效率的提升。 This paper uses the concept of the stochastic frontier model to measure the efficiency of local governments in Taiwan. We modify Brueckner's (1979) voter's bid-rent model to identify the determinants of the market value of land. Controlling for the determinants of land value that a local government cannot change, we measure inefficiency in the local government based upon a comparison of the market value and the highest attainable value of land. Our empirical results show that there exist significant differences of efficiency levels in providing local public goods of local governments. The unweighted average of efficiency levels declines with time during the sample period. Besides, the efficiency level of a local government is significantly positively correlated to the share of civil servant holding a college or higher degree, and the ratio of the number of civil servant to population; meanwhile, it is negatively correlated to the local government's grant dependency ratio. Therefore, encouraging civil servant to go for retraining, hiring more civil servant, and enhancing the own source revenue are measures to increase the efficiency level of a local government.

This paper uses the concept of the stochastic frontier model to measure the efficiency of local governments in Taiwan. We modify Brueckner's (1979) voter's bid-rent model to identify the determinants of the market value of land. Controlling for the determinants of land value that a local government cannot change, we measure inefficiency in the local government based upon a comparison of the market value and the highest attainable value of land. Our empirical results show that there exist significant differences of efficiency levels in providing local public goods of local governments. The unweighted average of efficiency levels declines with time during the sample period. Besides, the efficiency level of a local government is significantly positively correlated to the share of civil servant holding a college or higher degree, and the ratio of the number of civil servant to population; meanwhile, it is negatively correlated to the local government's grant dependency ratio. Therefore, encouraging civil servant to go for retraining, hiring more civil servant, and enhancing the own source revenue are measures to increase the efficiency level of a local government.