康得原則在污染防制議題之可行性分析

Feasibility Study of Kantian Maxim on the Issue of Pollution Prevention

本文應用Laffont （1975）、Bordignon （1990）及Bilodeau and Gravel（2004）的康得原則於廠商負擔污染防治成本的賽局模型，進而分析自發性污染防治協議的道德限制對廠商行為的影響。模型結果證明，自發性污染防治協議可使廠商間存在一個符合道德評價相同及理性的康得原則（道德限制），則各廠商會提供林德爾均衡量，且為柏拉圖效率解。 This paper use Kantian Maxim of Laffont (1975)、Bordignon (1990) and Bilodeau and Gravel (2004) on the game in which firms spontaneously prevent or control pollution was set to understand how the voluntary agreement influences the behaviors of firms. The results proved that voluntary agreement makes firms agree with the moral restraint of firm interaction, Kantian Maxim, which meets the same moral evaluation and ration assumption. In Kantian Maxim, all firms provide Lindahl equilibrium quantity and Pareto efficiency solution.

This paper use Kantian Maxim of Laffont (1975)、Bordignon (1990) and Bilodeau and Gravel (2004) on the game in which firms spontaneously prevent or control pollution was set to understand how the voluntary agreement influences the behaviors of firms. The results proved that voluntary agreement makes firms agree with the moral restraint of firm interaction, Kantian Maxim, which meets the same moral evaluation and ration assumption. In Kantian Maxim, all firms provide Lindahl equilibrium quantity and Pareto efficiency solution.