多樣追尋遊憩行為對休閒遊憩業訂價策略與社會福利之影響

Effects of Variety-Seeking Recreation Behavior on Pricing Policies and Social Welfare in the Recreation Industry

In this paper, we present a two-stage game to analyze how a firm prices its two recreation activities in the presence of tourists' variety-seeking recreation behavior in the recreation industry. The concept of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is applied to solve the two-stage game. We study and compare the prices, the number of tourists, profits of the firm, consumer surplus and social welfare under the two pricing policies. We find that the firm's profit, consumer surplus and social welfare are lower under the single pricing policy, which does not take tourists' varietyseeking recreation behavior into account in the process of pricing decision. We also conduct numerical simulations to illustrate the theoretical implications of tourists' variety-seeking recreation behavior. 本文利用兩階段賽局分析當遊客具有多樣追尋遊憩行為時，在休閒遊憩產業中的廠商如何對其不同遊憩活動進行訂價。在兩種不同的訂價策略下，我們探討並比較價格、遊客人數、廠商利潤、消費者剩餘以及社會福利之差異。本文發現，由於在單一訂價策略下未考量遊客的多樣追尋遊憩行為，因而廠商利潤、消費者剩餘以及社會福利水準都比較低。另外，我們也進行了數值模擬以說明遊客多樣追尋遊憩行為的理論意涵。

本文利用兩階段賽局分析當遊客具有多樣追尋遊憩行為時，在休閒遊憩產業中的廠商如何對其不同遊憩活動進行訂價。在兩種不同的訂價策略下，我們探討並比較價格、遊客人數、廠商利潤、消費者剩餘以及社會福利之差異。本文發現，由於在單一訂價策略下未考量遊客的多樣追尋遊憩行為，因而廠商利潤、消費者剩餘以及社會福利水準都比較低。另外，我們也進行了數值模擬以說明遊客多樣追尋遊憩行為的理論意涵。