農地使用變更外部性處理的制度分析

The Institutional Analysis of Externalities Generated by Farmland Use Conversion

本文基於「財產權配置」的觀點，分別從私人財產權保障程度的差異、農地使用的地貌、農地使用的「政策目標」、與其中制度所隱含的政治風險等角度，分析比較了不同農地使用變更制度對於外部性處理方式的優劣。分析的對象包括「國土計畫法」、現行的農地使用變更制度、與Colwell（1997）所提議的TOS制度等。根據分析結果，沒有哪一種農地使用變更制度是「最佳」的制度，能在各項評比項目中都能勝出。因此我們只能針對特定的要求來選擇「較佳」的農地使用變更制度。如果認為個人的權利應優先受到保障，則TOS制度會是較佳的選擇；如果認為農業規劃機關的政策目標是較重要的，則「國土計畫法」或現行的農地使用變更制度較能達到此一政策目標。 Based on the allocation theory of property rights, this paper compares the different remedies of the externalities which are caused by farmland use conversion from the viewpoints of: (1) the protection of farmland property right, (2) the lay of farmland, (3) the goal of farmland use policy, and (4) the political risk involved in an institution. This paper aims to study the ”national land use plan act”, the current institution of farmland use conversion, and the ”tender offer system” proposed by Colwell (1997). According to the present analysis, the best institution itself does not exist indeed. No institution can win every category of the evaluation. But we can still find a better institution in specific conditions. This research concludes that if the rights of landowners are more important than the goal of farmland use policy, then the ”tender offer system” is a better institution in handling the externalities; otherwise, the ”national land use plan act” and the current institution can achieve the goal of policy more easily.

Based on the allocation theory of property rights, this paper compares the different remedies of the externalities which are caused by farmland use conversion from the viewpoints of: (1) the protection of farmland property right, (2) the lay of farmland, (3) the goal of farmland use policy, and (4) the political risk involved in an institution. This paper aims to study the ”national land use plan act”, the current institution of farmland use conversion, and the ”tender offer system” proposed by Colwell (1997). According to the present analysis, the best institution itself does not exist indeed. No institution can win every category of the evaluation. But we can still find a better institution in specific conditions. This research concludes that if the rights of landowners are more important than the goal of farmland use policy, then the ”tender offer system” is a better institution in handling the externalities; otherwise, the ”national land use plan act” and the current institution can achieve the goal of policy more easily.