作為財產的智慧財產權－－界定資訊權利

Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information

本文提出，知識財產與一般財產的緊密聯繫，源於資訊成本在界定和實施排他權中發揮的重要作用。正如很多學者強調的，資訊的非競爭性導致知識財產的排他權在阻止他人使用上比有形財產的成本更高。可是即便智慧財產權沒有解決分配問題，它仍可以讓那些發現、利用資訊的人佔有競爭性投入的獎勵。從成本的角度，排他權是一個潛在的捷徑：資訊排他權能簡單地、非直接地、低成本地解決從競爭性投入中獲得收益的問題。本文建立在排他和治理為界定產權之互補性策略的框架上，並提出哪些因素傾向於排他策略、哪些因素則相反的若干命題。排他權在資訊權利系統中所發揮的作用－－允許資訊隱藏在隱喻的邊界之後－－既是其長處，也是短處。由於排他權會隨著互聯資訊價值的提高而愈發昂貴、更有價值，我們是否應當期待更多的排他以及更多的排他是否可欲，這是一個實證問題。本文用資訊──成本理論來解釋類侵權的著作權與類財產權的專利權之間的一些基本區別。資訊──成本理論也為權利結構的實證證據提供些許支援，例如商業組織規則。知識財產，和普通財產一樣，可以被視為解決根據投入分配產出這一複雜協調問題的（最多算是）次優的方案。

This artic1e proposes that intellectual property's c1ose relationship to property stems from the role that information costs play in the delineation and enforcement of exc1usion rights. As theorists have emphasized, the nonrivalness of information causes exc1usive rights to be more cost1y in terms of forgone use than in the law of tangible property. But if intellectual property does not solve a problem of allocation, it can play a role in allowing those who find and develop information to appropriate the retums from their rival inputs. It is on the cost side that exc1usion emerges as a possible shortcut: exc1usive rights in information are simple, indirect, and low-cost devices for solving the problem of appropriating the retums from these rival inputs. Building on a framework that identifies exclusion and govemance as complementary strategies for defining property rights, the article derives some propositions about which factors can be expected to push toward and away from exc1usion in delineating entitlements to information. The role that exc1usion plays in keeping the system of entitlements over information modular－allowing information to be hidden behind metaphorical boundaries－is both its strength and its weakness. Because exc1usion is both more cost1y and potentially more beneficial as interconnected information becomes more valuable, it is an empirical question whether we would expect more exclusion－and whether it would be desirable. The artic1e uses this information-cost theory to explain some of the basic differences between the more tort-like copyright regime and the more property-like patent law. The information-cost theory also has implications for suggestive sources of empirical evidence on the structure of entitlements, such as rules within business organizations. Intellectual property, like property in general, can be seen as (at best) a second-best solution to a complex coordination problem of attributing outputs to inputs.