教育配額、累進稅和長期產出

EDUCATION QUOTAS, PROGRESSIVE TAXES, AND LONG-RUN OUTPUT

累進稅（progressive tax）是許多國家採行的稅制，但現有理論分析常認為：累進稅因降低人們累積人力資本或技術勞力工作的誘因，而不利於長期經濟表現。本文嘗試提出一個可能：稅制若能使窮人家的聰明小孩，取代富有人家的比較不聰明小孩，獲得招生名額有限的高等教育機會，或許有助於窮人家跨代向上流動（upward intergenerational mobility）；並藉由窮人家小孩的聰明才智與其所發揮的同儕效果，也有益於提升社會整體的人力素質與長期產出。文中設計一個包含高整教育名額有限、學生為聯考而補習和勞動供給內生決定的二期疊代模型，並以數值模擬來呈現上述論點。

Theoretical studies often suggest that progressive taxes, when compared to flat-rate taxes, are harmful for economic performance. This paper attempts to provide an alternative. We show that progressive taxes might be good for long-run output and upward intergenerational mobility in a society with education quotas. Since the number of students of a university is limited, progressive taxes might result in more talented children of the poor going to universities instead of the untalented children of the rich. This might stimulate the educated workers to accumulate more human capital by peer effects. Therefore the positive effect of human capital accumulation on output might outweigh the negative impact of work hour reduction in some situations and have higher output in the long run.