獨家經銷下雙佔零售商領導訂價及其競爭方式

Retail-Stackelberg Duopoly Pricing and Competitive Strategies at Sole Distributorship

本文在兩家製造商與兩家零售商的通路以獨家經銷架構下，探討零售商領導訂價方式決定的議題。相對於過去的文獻，本文係在固定彈性的非線性需求函數設定下，來進行探討，並得到下述三個主要結果：1.在已知零售商進行價格競爭的情況下，零售商採取成本加成訂價方式較有利，而非一般文獻採用的零售利差訂價方式。2.在已知零售商進行銷售量競爭的情況下，成本加成訂價方式亦為零售商最佳的訂價選擇。3.在零售商的訂價領導下，兩商品為替代性，此時零售商將採取成本加成訂價方式，而零售商會進行銷售量競爭；兩商品若為互補性時，零售商將採取成本加成訂價方式，而零售商會進行價格競爭。

This paper examines issues related to pricing leadership of retailers of two manufacturers and two retailers under the structure of sole distributor channel. In contrast with literature review, this paper conducts discussion on the assumption of fixed and flexible non-linear demand function and concludes with three major findings as follows: 1. Under the known price competition between retailers, retailers adopt cost markup pricing and not margin pricing proposed by literature review. 2. Under the known sales volume competition between retailers, cost markup pricing is also the optimal choice. 3. When retailers compete for sales volume and adopt cost markup pricing, competition of retailers relate to the characteristics of products; if products of two retailers are alternative or independent goods, retailers will compete over sales volume and if the products are complementary goods, retailers will compete on pricing.