內部資本市場中的社會主義下之組織層級設計

Hierarchy Design with Socialism in Internal Capital Markets

近來許多實證研究發現，在多部門公司中，利潤較高的部門常投資過少；而利潤較低的部門常投資過多。這現象在文獻中被稱為「內部資本市場中的社會主義」(SICM)。本文嘗試由這個角度，來比較扁平型組織與高深型組織之效率。我們將SICM模型加入一個組織可以經由授權予部門經理，而從一個高深型組織，轉型成扁平型組織的可能性。我們發現此一部門化之作為，會使得SICM的問題更嚴重。此一發現，否定了Williamson著名的M型假説(M-form hypothesis)。另外，一個部門化公司中的SICM問題，可以經由將股權授予低階經理人的方式，獲得舒解。

This paper compares the efficiency of flat and tall hierarchies from the perspective of “socialism in internal capital markets” (SICM) – a recently documented problem of multi-segment firms in which high-profit segments tend to be underinvested and low-profit segments tend to be overinvested. SICM is characterized with the possibility of divisionalization – grouping elementary business segments into divisions and delegating decisions to division managers, which transforms flat hierarchies into tall hierarchies. We found that divisionalization aggravates the problem of SICM, suggesting that U-form (undivisionalized) organizations can outperform M-form (divisionalized) organizations – a result that is in contrast to Williamson’s “M-form hypothesis.” In addition, the SICM problem for a given divisionalized firm can be alleviated by redirecting more managerial ownership from high-tier managers to low-tier managers.