邊際工資補貼的取代效果

A Note on the Displacement Effects of Marginal Wage Subsidies

邊際工資補貼只對超過某水準的廠商僱用量進行補貼，然而此種補貼方式有產業內的競爭問題：某些廠商可能增加僱用量，但卻排擠其他廠商的僱用量。因此，批評者一般認為，邊際補貼無異於全體補貼，有巨大財政成本而增加就業效果卻有限。本文針對邊際工資補貼的取代效果建立一模型，分析結果顯示，一般而言，即使存在廠商間的取代效果，邊際補貼比全體補貼創造更大的產出和就業量，且在財政上較具效率。

The efficiency of marginal wage subsidies, which are paid only for a firm’s additional employment exceeding some reference level, suffers from intra-industry competition effects. Some firms might expand employment, but mainly at the cost of crowding out employment in other firms. Hence, critics expect that marginal subsidies are equivalent to general subsidies and create large fiscal costs without much gain in employment. We develop a model that specifically focuses on the displacement effects of marginal wage subsidies. Our results show that marginal subsidies generally create larger output and employment effects and are fiscally more efficient than general subsidies despite their between-firm displacement effects.