資訊揭露政策與市場績效

Disclosure Policy and Market Performances

在雙元技術因素下，投機客們持有不完全卻相關聯的企業技術多元雜訊信號，在金融市場交易企業上市工具時，市場結清條件會決定資產價格，價格會提供資本供給者所能學習的資訊內容；而資本供給者更新資訊信念後，會求出他們的最適投資法則，轉而決定被交易資產的現金流量。最後，並得到投機客們的最適交易策略。我們發現該企業技術在外部融通下，整體經濟會因不同類型的技術公開揭露資訊而對實質效率性有不同的效應；其中資本供給者所要學習的技術資訊被公開後，反而為實質效率性帶來不好的影響。

Under dual technologies, speculators with incomplete multi-noisy signals about technologies trade a risky asset, and thus decide equilibrium price. Price may provide information that capital suppliers could learn. Therefore, capital providers will solve for the optimal investing rule after updating their belief, and then cash flow of a traded asset and the optimal traded strategy can be catched. This study finds that there are diverse real efficient effects of public disclosure about technology under outside finance. Real efficiency has deteriorated after releaseing information by capital provider want to learn.