知識依舊是宣稱之規範

Knowledge Is (Still) the Norm of Assertion

本文將論證，宣稱 (assertion) 這個語言行為必須符合「知識規範原則」(the knowledge norm)，即某主體應該宣稱某一命題只有當該主體知道這個命題。本文的前半部將分析三個反對知識作為「宣稱之規範原則」(the norm of assertion) 的「反例」：錯誤宣稱、無私 (selfless) 宣稱以及基於純粹證成真信念 (mere justified true belief) 的宣稱。本文將指出這些例子並不構成知識規範原則的真正反例。然而，當代對宣稱規範原則的討論經常會演變成直覺 (intuition) 的較量：某方以直覺來支持自己的立場，而反對方亦以直覺作為反對的手段。訴諸直覺在方法論上無疑有其限制，當雙方都堅持自己的直覺時往往討論就會陷入僵局。為了克服這個限制，本文將在後半部分提出一個不直接訴諸直覺的論證來支持知識規範原則。這個論證從宣稱作為一種獨特的語言行為 (speech act) 出發。本文將指出，宣稱在語言行為中扮演提供我們正確的世界圖像（訊息）的角色，而為了要成功扮演這個角色，所有的宣稱都必須是知識，不基於知識的宣稱是應該受到批評的。

In this paper, I defend the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion. I first examine three prominent “counterexamples”: false assertion, selfless assertion, and assertion based on mere justified true belief. I argue that they all fail to square well with our ordinary intuitions. However, the contemporary debate over the norm of assertion depends heavily on the method of counterexamples, whose crux is to prompt our intuitions regarding the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of a certain kind of assertions. This method has its limits as sometimes the debate simply boils down to a clash of intuitions. I think we can do better. In the second part of the paper, I construct a positive argument for the knowledge norm, showing that the knowledge norm can be derived from the general account of the conversational role of assertion. I argue that in order for assertion to play the role it plays in conversation, the knowledge norm must hold.