真理與意識：從佛性論爭到朱陸異同的二種哲學類型

Truth and Mind: the Polemics in the Philosophical Trajectories from Chinese Buddhism to Neo-Confucianism

如來藏思想與唯識學之間的爭論，特別是在漢傳佛教傳統的脈絡，其哲學意涵如何？擴大言之，該爭論在整體東亞哲學的發展上有何影響？我們又該如何評估該爭論的影響？關於這些問題，本文的回應主要選取七世紀末法寶和慧沼的爭論作為考察的起點，指出如來藏思想與唯識學的對立在漢語語境下確立了新的哲學論述方向，關連到十一世紀以降宋明新儒學的問題意識，特別是心學與理學的對立發展。此論爭的哲學問題首度被法寶和慧沼表述為心與理之同一或差異的問題，也就是後來宋明理學中「心理二分」或「心即理」二種形上學之爭的問題。從結論上來說，奘傳唯識學（慧沼）和程朱理學主張心理二分，而如來藏思想（法寶）和陸王心學則主張心即理，彼此之間既有歷史的連續性，也顯示出哲學類型的普遍性。本文結論時，將試圖從現象學的視角，特別是從胡賽爾到海德格的發展，重新照明主導千年東亞哲學的二種哲學類型義蘊。

This article attempts to demonstrate the universality of philosophical significance in both the Vijñaptimātra-Tathāgatagarbha controversy between Huizao (648-714) and Fabao (627-705) in the late 7th century, on the one hand, and the Neo-Confucian debate between Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Lu Xiangshan (1139-1193) in the 12th century, on the other hand. More surprisingly, the same pattern of hermeneutic conflict continued in East Asia from the 7th century down to the early 20th century. The debate between Lü Cheng (1896-1989) and Xiong Shili (1885-1968), which was centered upon the criticism of the Awakening of Faith ignited by Ouyang Jingwu and his school, is one of the most significance. In the beginning, the philosophical problem in the polemic is raised to spell out the conditions for attaining the Buddhahood. Two theories are developed in both the Buddhist and the Neo-Confucian to answer this problem. (1) The first theory, which takes a cognitive approach, contends that the condition for attaining the Buddhahood or sagehood is found in the mind which is capable of cognizing the truth. Truth is taken as the object of cognition, while mind is the subject of cognition. Truth is transcendent. Both Yogācāra and Zhu Xi hold this theory. (2) The second theory, which takes an ontological approach, holds that the condition for attaining the Buddhahood or sagehood is found in the subjectivity which is transcendentally grounded in truth. Truth is both transcendent and immanent. This theory even goes further to claim that mind is truth. This theory is held by both the Tathāgatagarbha School and Lu Xianshan. In the conclusion, I take an excursion to exercise a phenomenological reflection on the debate. The insight we obtain from phenomenology is that truth in formal logic should be also evidenced in eidetic intuition. That is, truth should not be separated from the experience of truth, which is possible only in the activity of mind.