英文摘要 |
In the field of philosophy of science, I. Lakatos is first of all considered a methodologist of scientific research programmes. Lakatos’ methodology (abbreviated in this paper, MSRP) not only supersedes that of Popper’s falsificationism, but also incorporates the essential part of T. Kuhn’s historical approach, i.e., scientific practices into its formation. Theoretically speaking, it is rather common to portray Lakatos’ philosophy as a modified combination of Popper and Kuhn. However, due to its rationalistic image implanted from Popper’s critical rationalism, this combination has been severely criticized by P. Feyerabend for lacking consistency. Feyerabend’s criticism let alone being successful or not, points out the following question: why would Lakatos insist on a rationalistic position even without a persuasive argument to defend it? The answer to this question is likely to be one which has something to do with Lakatos’ personal conviction linking with his academic background back to the time before his settlement in England. Indeed, there are researches demonstrating that what Lakatos did before exiling to England was secretively incorporated into his philosophy in general and MSRP in particular. Among these researches, I. Hacking’s paper on Lakatos’ philosophy of science holds a role of crucial importance. According to Hacking, other than the English part, Lakatos’ philosophy contains a Hegelian part. Hacking vindicates that the dialectical development of theory and practice prevailing in Hungary dominates much of Lakatos’ ideas consisting in MSRP. While noticing this role of the dialectical method in Lakatos’ philosophy, we also retain the role of critical rationality long exercised by Lakatos and fortified by his acquaintance of Popper. We hence put forward an argument sustaining the combination of the dialectic method and the critical rationality in Lakatos’ MSRP. The combination holds all things dynamically and thus demonstrates the rational construction of the history of science. The demonstration is therefore not merely a matter of Lakatos’ personal conviction, but also an outcome of scientific progress established on the unity of theoretical and practical rationality. |