經驗以及理並外在的限制

Experience and Rational External Constraint

在〈一個真理與知識的融貫理論〉(〝A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge〞)這篇文章中，戴維森提出一個關於知識的融貫理論。其中，他宣稱了一個著名的命題：「除了其他信念之外，沒有任何事物能做為持有一信念的理由。」 在《心靈與世界》(Mind and World)一書裡，邁道爾(J. McDowell)批評說，戴維森的理論並未合理說明我們的信念與世界之間的關聯，也使得內容這個概念變得不可理解。本文試圖釐清這兩位哲學家關於感官經驗和經驗內容的爭議。 我將指出，他們的爭執是在以下兩個論題上：第一，關於經驗思想所需的理性限制和外在限制是否可以分開處理？第二，關於經驗內容的說明是否在理論上優先於戴維森的基進詮釋理論？接著我將嘗試使他們的爭議有所進展。我將考量戴維森對邁道爾的反駁，然後從邁道爾的立場來對戴維森的意見提出兩點質疑：首先，從邁道爾的角度，戴維森所謂的經驗是非概念性的。這樣的經驗能否提供用以修正信念的理由，是令人存疑的。其次，戴維森用來說明內容的三角測量理論其實已經預設了內容這個概念。

In 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' Donald Davidson proposes a coherence picture of knowledge in which he makes the famous claim that 'nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.' In Mind and World, John McDowell criticizes Davidson's theory for failing to make room for the connection between our worldviews and reality and leaving the notion of content unintelligible. In this paper I try to clarify their disagreement regarding perceptual experience and empirical content. I suggest that their dispute lies in the following two issues: whether the rational and external constraints on empirical thought can be treated separately, and whether an account of empirical content is theoretically prior to radical interpretation. Then I explore some possibilities by which their debate may be advanced. I make two moves on behalf of McDowell to show how Davidson's reply to his criticism may be found unsatisfactory. First, from a McDowellian point of view, it is not clear how Davidson's nonconceptual notion of experience might provide reason for revising beliefs. Second, Davidson's triangulation account of content presupposes the notion of content already.