英文摘要 |
Husserl and Heidegger propose different conceptions of Self-Transcendence: Husserl sees the constitution of the world founded on the transcendental subject which holds the significance of Self-Transcendence; Heidegger thinks the disclosedness of Being (Sein) as the Whither (Wohin) of the Self-Transcendence of Being-There (Dasein). Life or Death of the transcendental subject means the possession or loss of the ability of knowing and discoursing upon the world (including the discoursing upon Life and Death). Life and Death of Being-There makes an issue of the whole structure of the Being-in-the-world. But here an authentic (unlimited) and an inauthentic (limited) whole of Being-There need be differentiated. As experience of death, Being-towards-death can turn over the factical, thrown and limited whole of Being-There into the existential, projected and unlimited whole of Being-There. The authentic whole of Being-There is not closed by the factical life and death, but open for an authentic 'life' as the disclosedness of Being. Because the constitution and discourse upon the world knowledge belongs to the factical and closed sphere of Being-There, so the discourse upon life and death is not the experience of death itself which let Being-There disclosed. The Husserlian transcendental subject, who benefits all discourses, must at first 'die', so that the Heideggerian Being-There can be open for the authentic 'life'. The discourse - above all the 'proof' - often lets us be far from the authentic existence; but how can we be aware of and reflect the our ownmost authentic existence only by 'showing' the life-death-problem? |