賦予肉體理性主義－－對賦予肉體的認知科學之批判

Embodied Rationalism-- A Critique of Embodied Cognitive Science

克拉克論證認知科學需要概念上及方法上的大幅改革。傳統認知科學中這些明顯的區分（如心靈－身體，知覺－認知－行動等），應被一個「賦予肉體的」觀點所取代。這改革過的認知科學將強調行動取向的心靈表徵、大自然的節儉性、腦利用認知鷹架（例如語言）的方法，以及心靈延伸入世界的趨勢。克拉克的觀點過於強調「賦予肉體性」。故於本文的第一部分我論證下列數點：(1)克拉克的行動取向表徵無法解釋高層次的認知。(2)克拉克未能妥切的闡明一些關鍵概念，如「意志」。(3)他忽略了不反應的重要性。(4)他忽視從內在環境學習的價值。(5)他的切入法與科學唯實論並不相容。於第二部分我論證克拉克過度強調對於演化論的一種不完整的概念，以及他使大自然似乎能同時既節儉又浪費。在第三部分，我論證認知鷹架有許多不良的效應；以及克拉克的切入法使得認知鷹架的發明看似一種奧秘。於第四部分，我論證克拉克未能妥適的區分認知與非認知的系統以及認知的核心與周邊。最後，我論證克拉克仍試著使用一些已被他所排拒的傳統概念，他並未提出如何區分排拒或保存的原則標準。

Clark argues that cognitive science is in need of conceptual and methodological reorientation. The sharp distinctions of traditional cognitive science-- e.g. mind-body and perception-cognition-action-- should be replaced by an 'embodied,' 'embedded' view (minds in bodies, performing in environments, under the constraints of real-time). This reoriented cognitive science would emphasize action-oriented representations, the thriftiness of nature, the ways brains exploit external scaffolding (e.g. language), and the tendency of the mind to extend into the world. Clark's view is too 'embodied' and too 'embedded.' Specifically, in section one I argue the following: (1) Clark's action-oriented representations cannot xplain high-level cognition. (2) Clark fails to adequately explicate certain key concepts, e.g. 'action' and 'volition.' (3) He overlooks the importance of not reacting. (4) He neglects the value of learning from the inner environment. And, (5) his approach is incompatible with scientific realism, a view that is needed for its methodological bite. In section two, I argue that Clark (1) invokes parsimony when the principle doesn't apply, (2) ignores an important half-truth, and (3) flirts with a dubious view of adaptation. In section three I argue that scaffolds have many deleterious effects and that Clark's approach makes the invention of scaffolds seem a mystery. Finally, in section four, I argue that Clark creates a red-herring, in part by failing to adequately distinguish the cognitive from the non-cognitive and central from peripheral cognition. Further, I point out that embodied cognitive science may need to incorporate certain aspects of rationalism, if it is to adequately account for some concepts that it seems reluctant to discard.