在國家權力與家族主義之間： 企業控制與台灣大型企業間網絡再探

Between the State Power and Chinese Familism: Corporate Control and Intercorporate Networks in Taiwan Revisited

在台灣，公部門事業與民間企業之間的股權與董監事網絡，一直是個影響市場活動的重要組織治理結構。然而其具體運作與形成根源卻被學者所忽略；既有解釋台灣市場發展的兩大理論（以強調強勢國家模型為核心的政治論、以及以華人家族主義為主的網絡論），對此展示了理論與經驗研究上的空白。本文嘗試重新挖掘與分析這個被忽視的經驗現象、確認這個既有理論典範之外的經驗異態(anomaly)、並探討其形成以及轉變如何受強勢的制度權力與社會結構所影響。本文以制度論的分析架構來解釋台灣大型企業股權與董監事網絡的形成， 並形成對企業總體網絡的性質與結構的研究假設。透過分析台灣的公部門事業與民間上市公司之間的股權與董監事網絡的形成，考察國家與家族主義的因素如何一起影響台灣大型企業網絡的形成。透過1960年代末與1990年代末兩個時間點的資料分析，本文探討國家權力如何透過三種組織間網絡機制，而得以控制市場行動者、考察這個公、民間網絡結構的內在特性、追溯其形成的歷史條件並建立初步的類型學、探討國家與民間企業在整體網絡中的相對位置，並比較台灣的企業董監網絡與西方主要工業國家的差異。最後並透過對企業轉投資網絡活動的統計分析，來展現這種由公部門強勢主導的網絡結構對市場行動者的影響。本文的主要論點是統治權力的控制律令、以及家族文化的延續慣習，總鑲嵌在看似經濟理性卻承載著制度與文化傳統的企業組織關係中，而社會學家唯有考察組織所鑲嵌的社會文化與制度因素，才能掌握企業組織的演變與運作緣由。藉著這種視角才能適當的理解這種攸關台灣企業經濟權力與策略統理機構的成型與演變。文末並討論在企業組織研究、發展理論與經濟社會學上的研究意涵。

Situated within the research context of corporate control, this study investigates the extent to which the intercorporate networks of big businesses in Taiwan are influenced by state intervention and the persistent practice of Chinese familism. This study begins by developing an institutionalist approach to market governance through integrating the control imperative of state power into the framework of intercorporate network analysis, and accordingly, derives hypotheses that are tested with empirical analyses. This paper argues that corporate control is exercised through relational measures that the institutional authority seeking dominance can utilize. By tracing the strategized relations between the institutional authority and corporate actors, it is possible to comprehend how market dominance is maintained via affiliational actions in particular historical conjunctures. This paper then provides a historical survey of the investment portfolios of major, state-owned firms; identifies the underlying networking patterns, and explains three intercorporate mechanisms through which control may be exercised. Empirical analyses of intercorporate networks in 125 major state-owned and private firms during late 1990s reveal that both prominent state power and the cultural practice of Chinese familism are at work: While the particularistic networking generates a localized tendency of group formation, it is the overlapping participation of state-owned firms that eventually linked the provincial clusters of private firms together on a global level. This feature has resulted in the tendency of state-owned firms to occupy dominant network positions and engendered a network construction distinctively different from those in major industrialized economies. A dyadic statistical analysis of equity alliances among 77 major, private firms further demonstrates the structural constraints that this politicized market interface may impose upon corporate activities. Overall, analyses from this study discover empirical manifestations inimical to existing theories about Taiwan's market development. Implications for organization studies, the development state literature, and broader research contexts are discussed.