「罪情遏欲」到「形色天性」──王船山的情欲論及其歷史地位

Wang Fu-Chih's (Wang Fu-Zhi's) Critique On Common Idividuality Of Later Ming's Trend Of Thought

近人溝口雄三指出明末清初思想的特徵，在對「欲」與「私」的肯定，他認為這種「座標轉位」是儒學的重要的發展與重構，並以之為中國近代思想之源，這個說法引起學者的討論，甚至以「達情遂欲」為主要的義理線索來疏理明清儒學與經世、考證等思潮的關係，總之是以「肯定情欲」為儒學的新轉向，而具有近代或現代意義。
近人研究船山之人道論，多以其「理欲觀」為切入點，認為船山對「情、才、欲」的新看法十分符合近代人士對個人解放的訴求，而於近現代思想的發展有獨特的價值與意義。然而學者論及清初儒者對「氣質、才、情」與「人欲」的正面肯定時，也注意到船山學有其特殊之處：首先是以船山「理欲」之說存在著出入前後兩個典型的痕跡，由是懷疑船山同時有「肯定人欲」與「存理滅欲」的內在矛盾。其二是如王汎森先生所言：在認同「對欲的重新重視」的前提下，發現船山並非主張「情欲大解放」一路，他認為船山把氣質與人心合一，原先「天理人欲」極為嚴格的二元對立已經漸漸消解。由是，船山不應放在「情欲解放」的系譜中，他其實標志了心性之學終結前最後一次的奮鬥。
唐君毅先生以為，明清之際能上承宋明儒學的問題，自樹新義，以補宋明儒之不足者，只有船山。本文擬探討：若船山學為宋明儒學的進一步發展，則船山雖出入於兩個典範之間，其言「天理人欲之合一」、「公私界限之分際」，是否能在義理上獲得完整的說明，而無內在的矛盾？船山肯定整全生命狀態的「氣」或「情才欲」是否造成心性之學的終結，而「肯定情欲」的人性論由是走向「情欲大解放」之路，不免為放蕩逾檢的行為提供思想的根據？

Mizoguchi Yuzo indicated that the features of ideology between late Ming and early Qing were affirming “desire” and “privacy.” Mizoguchi held this type of “coordinate translocation” to be an important development and reconstruction of Confucianism, using this as the basis of modern Chinese thought. This formulation elicited discussion among scholars, who even took “revealing sentiments and the fulfillment of desire” as the primary rationalist thread to reorganize the relationship between Ming-Qing Confucianism and the ideological trends of statecraft and textual research. Ultimately, “affirming passions” was taken as a new direction in Confucianism, with modern or contemporary significance. In researching the humanism of Wang Chuanshan, most contemporaries have used “reason and desire” as the entry point, holding that Chuanshan's new views on emotion, talent, and desire conform well to the aspirations of modern people for personal liberation, attributing unique value and meaning to modern thoughts. However, when scholars have addressed the positive approval of early Qing Confucians toward temperament, talent, and emotions and human desires, they have noted that the Chuanshan School has unique elements. First, in Chuanshan's speech on reason and desire, traces of two thought models exist. From this, it is doubtful that Chuanshan simultaneously held the inherent contradictions of affirming human desire, and preserving reason and eliminating desire. Second, as stated by Fan-sen Wang, who, when recognizing the premise of a renewed emphasis on desire, discovered that Chuanshan did not advocate a method for the “great liberation of desire.” He believed that Chuanshan combined temperament with the hearts of the people, with the originally extremely strict binary opposition of “heavenly principle (reason) and human desires” already having been gradually dispelled. Thus, Chuanshan should not be placed within the pedigree of passionate liberation. In reality, he symbolized the final battle prior to the end of prevalence of the mind-nature theory. Tang Junyi believed that only Chuanshan was able to take on the problems of Neo-Confucianism during the Ming and Qing dynasties and establish new meanings to supplement the insufficiencies of Neo-Confucianism. This paper examines the following question: if the Chuanshan School was a further step in the development of Neo-Confucianism, then though Chuanshan arrived between two models, were the “integration of heavenly principle and human desire” and the “distinction of public and private boundaries” he spoke of completely describable in argumentation, without internal contradictions? Did the vital energy (qi) or emotion, talent, and passion in the entire life condition of which Chuanshan approved result in the conclusion of mind-nature thoery? Finally, did the humanism of “affirming passions” thereby turn toward the “great liberation of desire,” providing an ideological basis for dissolute, excessive behavior?