道德或反道德？──李贄及其「童心說」的再詮釋

Moral or Immoral ? Reinterpretation of Li Zhi and his 'Tongxin Shuo'

李贄是晚明爭議性極大的思想家。歷來皆認定其反傳統、反道學，但晚近學者則已漸能認可其儒學本質，然而對其「童心說」的內涵，依然眾說紛耘。故本論文重新考察之，先由其「童心者，真心也」之「真」，分析其包涵「生命本懷」、「生命實況」與「最高價值」三層次；其次探討李贄獨特的「理欲觀」與「義利觀」：由此進一步申論「童心」輿「道德」之辯證闢係。要言之，李贄之童心，為一「存人欲之天理」，然究其「天理」之實，則為一以「真」為唯一最高價值之精神，故著重破除對外律之盲從，若以其為「反道德」實屬誤解。

Li Zhi was a celebrated thinker of heresy in the Late-Ming Dynasty. He was a controversial figure during his lifetime or after his death. The Orthodox neo-Confucian scholars sternly denounced him, but in the May-Fourth Period time, he was considered an iconoclast and an anti-traditionalism. Therefore, the majority scholars neglected: Li Zhi was educated in traditional Confucian classics and he claimed himself to be a 'true Confucian'. Li Zhi's “Tongxm shuo” that was the core concepts of his learning should be regarded the succession and development from the Wang Yang-ming's philosophy of the mind, but many scholars presupposed his “Tongxin Shuo” to be the desire- emancipation theory. This study re-observes Li Zhi and his “Tongxin Shuo” and re- examines its meaning. Then we try to explain: His anti-traditionalism was an introduction to liberal treatment of Confucianism. On the other hand he advocated 'true mind' that cannot be considered the desire-emancipation theory, on the contrary, it was a thinking about morality of autonomy.