網路英式拍賣揭露代理人出價資訊的競標行為之實驗

Bidding Behavior under Proxy Agent Bidding Information in Online English Auctions: An Experiment

本研究檢驗網路英式拍賣的代理者自動出價資訊之揭露與否，對於買家的競標行為之影響。本文作者設計一個網路英式拍賣的實驗環境，以資訊與通訊電子產品作為拍賣標的物，讓賣家選擇是否在拍賣的出價歷史中，標示哪些出價是拍賣代理人的自動出價，並記錄買家在「有」、「無」此資訊下的競標行為，包括競標價格、競標次數、立即回應拍賣代理人的競標次數等。實驗的結果顯示：在拍賣的出價歷史中標示代理人自動出價的資訊，可減少該拍賣的買家之競標次數，也降低對代理人自動出價的立即回應，特別是在拍賣結束之前兩天，最為明顯，顯然此一資訊可避免網路英式拍賣中常見的瘋狂競價之現象。雖然揭露代理人自動出價可能吸引較少的競標次數，但是拍賣的最終結標價並不會明顯地較低。同時，在對買家的事後問卷調查亦發現：買家普遍地喜愛此一揭露訊息，一旦發現拍賣設有代理人自動出價，多數買家選擇不立即加價回應，顯示買家欲避免拍賣過程的瘋狂競價。此實驗發現的策略意涵有助於拍賣網站與賣家審視其拍賣機制，不僅是促進買家參與競標的心理意願，亦能不失賣家的拍賣利益之設計。

This research examined the influence of different information revelation features on bidding behavior, that is, the effect of notifying proxy agent bidding (PAB) information on the online English auction behavior. This study designed an experimental auction website to test bidding behaviors under revealed/hidden agent bidding information. The results suggest that auctions notifying PAB win fewer bids and attract less competitive proxy agent reactions, especially within the last two days of an auction. Even though the auction closing prices are non-significantly different, the mechanism of notifying PAB information is actually preferred for preventing auction buyers from bidding frenzy. The strategic implications of the mechanism design of Internet auction are not only attractive to buyers monetarily and psychologically but also safe to sellers due to information revelation.