英文摘要 |
This paper has one central concern: why did the U.S. policy dilemma regarding the Chinese offshore islands recur only three years after the first Taiwan Straits crisis of 1954-1955? Consensus has it that in attempting to involve the U.S. in a war with Communist China to realize his dream of returning to the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek deliberately increased the garrison of the offshore island s after the first crisis. Thus, the U.S. was forced to commit itself to use nuclear weapons for the defense of these islands to prevent the domino effects from their loss. But official documents reveal that U.S. policymakers did not solve the offshore islands problem after the 1955 crisis because they did not consider it necessary after having successfully deterred China's attack. They were also constantly preoccupied with crises all over the world, and preferred the status quo to forcing China to accept a final resolution. The U.S. thus assumed a default position of massive retaliation, making plans for using nuclear weapons to offset an all out Communist attack on the offshore islands. But after the shelling began, Washington tried desperately to avoid implementing these plans. The heart of the U.S. policy dilemma, then, was unwilling to yield any territory to the Communists while lacking sufficient resources to carry this policy out. In a word, the policy dilemma was general, rather than particular to the offshore islands issue. |