專利侵權訴訟被告廠商自願性資訊揭露之影響因素－－賽局理論與資源基礎觀點

Factors Influencing Voluntary Information Disclosure by the Defendant Firms in Patent Infringement Litigation Cases-Perspectives from Game Theory and RBV

相對於原告廠商，專利侵權訴訟對於被告廠商的影響更為巨大，然而先前專利訴訟研究卻罕見探討被告廠商自願性揭露資訊之行為。為彌補理論缺口，本研究以賽局理論和資源基礎觀點探討被告廠商在專利侵權訴訟初期的資訊揭露行為，並以2008 年至2010 年的17 個產業，152 筆台灣公開發行公司為被告廠商的專利訴訟事件作為研究對象。實證結果顯示，訴訟案件特質的多地告訴及ITC 告訴均對被告廠商之自願性資訊揭露有正向影響，而一對多告訴及原告廠商為專利權公司則具負向影響；廠商資源包括商譽和負債比率對被告廠商之自願性資訊揭露行為均具負向影響。

Compared with plaintiffs, the impacts of patent infringement litigation on defendants are much greater. Surprisingly, previous studies on patent infringement litigation devote less attention on the defendants' behavior of voluntary information disclosure. In order to fill the theoretical gap, this study adopts both game theory and resource-based view to explore the defendant's behavior of voluntary information disclosure during the earlier period of a patent litigation event. This study selected Taiwanese publicly held corporations which were defendants from 2008 to 2010, which consists of 152 litigation cases from 17 industries. Empirical results indicate that two characteristics of patent litigation cases, multiple-site lawsuits and ITC lawsuit, positively influence defendants' willing to voluntarily disclosure relevant information about patent infringement events, while one-to-multiple lawsuit and lawsuits initiated by patent trolls have a negative impact on the defendants' willing to disclosure. Regarding firm resources, the present study finds that goodwill and debt ratio are negatively related to the defendant's intention to voluntarily disclosure information.