臺灣的銀行高階經理人薪酬之研究

The Analysis for Executive Compensation of Taiwanese Banks

本研究主要探討我國銀行高階經理人的薪酬是否受到銀行經營績效表現所影響。由於近數十年來美國許多大型企業經營成效不彰但其高階經理人卻享有高薪酬，當2008 年發生歷史上第三次的經濟大蕭條（金融海嘯）後，全球各國開始注意到企業高階經理人的薪酬與其經營績效的關連並不合理，而開始檢討高階經理人的薪酬之標準判斷。這場金融海嘯同時波及臺灣的企業經營表現，使臺灣政府與投資者（股東）也開始重視企業高階經理人薪酬與公司績效表現的關係，因而立法要求公司設置「薪資報酬委員會」訂定高階經理人的薪資。因此，本研究收集臺灣17 家銀行業者在2005-2015 年期間的各項資料，將高階經理人的薪酬分為非誘因薪資與誘因報酬，研究發現臺灣10 家銀行高階經理人薪資具有效率。本文首次發現臺灣在2010 年要求設置「薪資報酬委員會」後，銀行高階經理人的薪資在薪資報酬法規制定後確實發生變化。

This study investigates whether the executive compensation of Taiwanese banks is related to their operating performance. In the past decades, the amount of the executive compensation in the United States is associated with weaker firm performance. After the great depression in 2008, Taiwan required the establishment of a compensation committee to construct a mechanism for the anti-fat cat. We divided the executive compensation from its structure into two types: incentive compensation and non-incentive compensation. The study collected the research samples of 17 banks in Taiwan from 2005-2015. Using panel data analysis, we investigated the executive compensation is significantly related to the bank performance but not to risk variables (Non-performing loan, Allowance for uncollectible account, etc ) and bank characteristics (bank holding company, bank size, etc). We also find the executive compensation of 10 banks is lower than the predicted compensation and it indicates that their compensation is efficient. Finally, there is a structure break for the executive compensation after compensation committee established in 2010.