英文摘要 |
This study examines profits for insider (un)pledged trading events in the Taiwan’s stocks market when comparing with firms with and without spending advertising fees. Additionally, Taiwan regulations make an announcement during five trading dates for insider (un)pledged trading events. We find evidence of higher profits for insider (un)pledged trading events with spending advertising fees during five days than those without spending advertising fees. It suggests that pledged insiders have stronger advantages of information asymmetries about future positive/negative side effects of spending advertising fees on stock returns. On the other hand, higher profits for insider unpledged trading events with spending advertising fees during five days than those for insider pledged trading events. Finally, market anomalies exist for momentum strategy of insider unpledged trading and spending advertising fees, not for that of insider pledged trading and spending advertising fees. Therefore, our findings should provide valuable insights on insider (un)pledged trading events and spending advertising fees. |