英文摘要 |
As an exception of the principle of forbidding litigation's subject combination, necessary common litigation origins from Germanic indigenous law, in which lawsuit groups can share the right of initiating litigations. At first, the existence of common litigation could be raised as a demurrer. With the expansion of the range of lawsuit group, such demurrer became questioned. Seeing the impartibility of the object of action, the identification criteria of necessary common litigation changed to be the identity of the object of action. After the separation of procedural law and substantive law, the identification criteria became adjusted by procedural law rather than substantive law. The common litigation was no longer mandatory but only initiated to avoid conflicting judgments. Therefore, the identification criteria transformed from 'one object of action' to 'one judgment', and the purpose of common litigation transfonned from applying 'one law' to applying 'one logic'. Thereby, the category of common litigation is also diversified, and similar necessary litigation comes into being. |