廠商結盟與污染防治下的環境稅

The Environmental Policy under Strategic Alliances and Pollution Abatement

本文設立一個同質寡占模型，透過廠商進行部分污染防治與完全結盟等行為設計，來分析政府最適環境政策的制定與影響，並發現短期時廠商結盟將降低最適環境稅與最適廠商污染防治與社會福利水準，但可改善環境污染危害程度；長期開放廠商自由進入將危害環境，但卻可提高環境稅收總數與社會福利水準。

This paper set up a homogeneous oligopoly model that firms do partial pollution abatement and strategic alliances with other actions to analyze the optimal environmental policies decision and impact, and found that alliance will reduce the optimal environmental tax, the optimal pollution abatement level and the social welfare, but can improve the environmental pollution damage in the short-run; it will increase the the environmental pollution damage, rise the tax revenue and social welfare levels at free entry in the long-run.