董監事暨重要職員責任保險與盈餘穩健性

Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance and Earnings Conservatism

本文以2008 年至2010 年為研究期間，採用Khan and Watts (2009)提出的衡量跨公司與跨年度盈餘穩健性指標──C-Score，探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險（Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance，簡稱D&O 保險）與盈餘穩健性之關聯性，並進一步分析D&O 保險與盈餘穩健性之關聯性是否因公司海外募資所面臨訴訟風險的增加而產生差異。實證結果發現，購買D&O 保險之公司，盈餘品質具有較高的穩健性，而且證據似乎亦顯示，購買D&O 保險金額愈大，盈餘穩健程度會愈高。此外，實證證據並未穩健地支持海外募集資金的活動，使得購買D&O 保險之公司其報導盈餘的穩健性會更明顯。

Using C-Score, which is a firm-year measure of earnings conservatism developed by Khan and Watts (2009), this study examines the effect of directors' and officers' liability (D&O) insurance on earnings conservatism, and explores whether the increased litigation risk caused by firm's cross-country-listing would influence the relationship between D&O insurance and earnings conservatism. With a sample of years 2008 - 2010, the empirical result confirms a significantly positive relationship between D&O insurance and earnings conservatism. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the greater the D&O insurance coverage, the stronger the relationship between D&O insurance and earnings conservatism. Finally, we do not find any significant evidence that cross-country-listing helps strengthen the aforementioned relationship.