蘑菇雲的陰影：中國第一顆原子彈爆炸前後的美台交涉，1963-1964

In the Shadow of the Mushroom Cloud:US -Taiwan Strategic Friction over Chinese Nuclear Explosion, 1963-1964

本文擬根據近年來新解密的外交檔案，梳理1960年代初期美國民主黨政府與臺灣蔣介石政權在對中共原子彈試驗問題上的分歧與合作，以此折射出冷戰時期美台同盟的若干特性。出於對中共崛起中的核力量的恐慌，以及為了實現“反攻大陸＂的計畫，蔣介石政府曾在不同的場合，多次要求美國支持其向中國大陸發動軍事進攻，以摧毀中共的核設施。但由於美台雙方在亞洲的戰略目標不同，甘迺迪和詹森政府對這些計畫先是採取拖延、擱置的態度，最終加以明確的拒絕，蔣介石聯美反攻的圖謀再次遭到挫敗。

Ever since the Chinese Nationalists (KMT) retreated to Taiwan after being defeated by Chinese Communists (CCP) in 1949, the KMT leadership headed by Chiang Kai-shek had made “returning to the mainland” the basic principle of their “temporary” regime in Taiwan, and persistently sought America’s support for the realization of this long-cherished wish. Nationalists’ efforts intensified in the early 1960s, when, for many times, they judged that the conditions in mainland China were vulnerable to military attacks across the strait. However, counseling caution in East Asia, both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations discouraged the Nationalists from launching any large-scale military operations against the mainland. Because of this, the interaction between Nationalist’s intent of retaking the mainland and American government’s opposition – thequarrel and friction between two allies – has been dominant themes on the subject of postwar US-Taiwan relations.