標準必要專利與競爭法之管制－－以違反FRAND/RAND承諾為中心

Standard Essential Patents and the Regulation of Competition Law

近年陸續出現不少標準必要專利權人以對潛在被授權人聲請禁制令之方式，排除潛在被授權人於市場外之爭議，引發各界對於標準必要專利與專利箝制風險之討論。針對標準必要專利權人違反FRAND/RAND授權承諾而行使排除或防止侵害權利之行為，競爭 法是否能管制此行為或應如何管制，即為本文欲探討之對象。因美國與歐盟為標準必要專利訴訟之主要戰場，影響產業甚深，故本文將先探討美國反托拉斯法及歐盟競爭法對於此一問題處理方式，再進一步探究我國公平交易法及相關實務是否能夠處理此一問題，並提供相關建議供主管機關參考。本文認為除可將專利箝制與反向專利箝制之風險納入考量外，並應就具體個案FRAND／RAND授權承諾之內涵予以瞭解，進一步考慮行政和解之可能性。

Recently, certain standard essential patent owners have excluded potential licensees from the market by seeking injunctions, raising intense discussion regarding standard essential patents and the risk of patent holdup. This article focuses on whether or how competition law should govern the behavior of standard essential patent owners who have violated the FRAND/RAND commitment and sought i吋unctions against potential licensees. This article explores how the United States and the European Union manage this issue, because they are the main sectors of standard essential patent lawsuits. Furthermore, this article examines whether the Taiwan Fair Trade Act and related precedents can solve this issue and provide relevant suggestions for authorities. In addition to considering the risks of patent holdup and reverse patent holdup, authorities should understand the principles of the FRAND/RAND commitment on the basis of specific cases and further consider the possibility of administrative settlement.